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THE GERMAN DUALITY OF STATE
AND SOCIETY
David Abraham
There are at least two reasons why Americans might well con-
sider the supplementation of our prevailing property-based nega-
tive rights regime with citizenship-based positive rights. The first is
that negative rights ("liberties") provide people possibilities that,
in our existing highly inegalitarian socioeconomic system, they are
unable to fulfill meaningfully. Freedom from censorship, for exam-
ple, is a valuable negative liberty that does little, if anything, to
foster literacy. Freedom of association, another example, means
little to those emarginated from society.
The second reason has to do with the immense and growing
inequality in the ownership of productive property. Notwithstand-
ing the legal renovations and additions of the Reconstruction, the
New Deal, and the Civil Rights eras of equal protection and funda-
mental rights jurisprudence, inequality in productive property own-
ership has continued to grow and continues to impede the nation's
democratic promise. The "new property," of which so much was
expected in the 1970s and 1980s, has proven to be no substitute for
"old property" and, consequently, a democratic society might be
better off uncoupling rights from property and grounding them in
something more universal and democratic, like citizenship.1 To a
certain extent, some European legal systems have moved in this
direction over the past half-century.
Juxtaposed to America's Lockean constitutional conception of
persons who are individualistic, self-regarding, and unencumbered,
Germany offers a constitutionalism more deeply implicating com-
munity and duty which is rooted in a history that has included sig-
nificant feudal and socialist impulses.2 The current German
1 On the promise and demise of new-property type welfare rights thinking, see William
H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1431 (1986);
William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991); William H.
Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REv. 1 (1985). Any
real transformation of the property regime would require amelioration of at least some of
the conditions that make it impossible for citizens to use their constitutional rights. See,
e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 Mic. L. REV. 694, 695-705 (1980).
2 See FRANZ NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: PoLIcIAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM IN MODERN SocmTY 179-285 (1986); DAVID ABRAHAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE
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Constitution, Grundgesetz ("Basic Law"), was adopted in 1949: in
the wake of defeated Nazism, in an atmosphere of popular-front
reformism, in the midst of a then still unresolved American/capital-
ist and Soviet/communist competition for German hearts and
minds, and under the watchful eyes of both Anglo-Saxon and Gal-
lic critics. West German society benefitted greatly from this partic-
ular conjuncture, and its Constitution writers were able to join the
most serviceable elements of their own traditions with those of the
negative liberty traditions.3
Whereas the centrality and strength of our negative liberties
testify to our acute distrust of state power, in contrast, the current
German Constitution (like some of its predecessors) underscores
the social connections and commitments of individual citizens. As
one German constitutional specialist has put it:
One vision [the American] is partial to the city perceived as a
private realm in which the individual is alone, isolated, and in
competition with his fellows, while the other vision [the Ger-
man] is partial to the city perceived as a public realm where in-
dividual and community are bound together in some degree of
reciprocity. Thus the authority of the community, as represented
by the state, finds a more congenial abode in German than in
American constitutionalism.4
This different constitutional concept may be applied to the
barrier encountered by the dissenters in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, one of the leading cases demonstrat-
ing the absence of positive rights in American law.5 The existence
of former Justice Marshall's "nexus"'6 or former Justice Brennan's
WEIMAR REPUBLIC 141 (2d ed. 1986). This feudal and socialist background is reflected in
the duties which the German constitution connects to the ownership of property and the
state's right to socialize landed and industrial property for the sake of the common weal.
Article 14(2) of the Grundgesetz (Constitution) states simply that: "Property entails obliga-
tions. Its use should also serve the public interest," translated in 7 CONSTrrtnONS OF THE
Cour~mms OF TE WORLD 111 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994) [here-
inafter CoNsTrrtrmoNs].
3 WEIMAR VERFASSUNG DES DErrscHEN REicIls (Constitution) arts. 119, 143, 145,
161, 163 (F.R.G.)(enumerating rights to family social supports, free education, national
health and old-age insurance, and employment or unemployment compensation).
4 Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J.
837, 867 (1991)(emphasis added).
5 411 U.S. 1 (1973). For other pivotal American cases stressing our negative liberty
tradition see Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
and Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983).
6 See, e.g. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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"effectuation ' 7 requirement between constitutionally granted fun-
damental rights and an array of positive social rights, such as the
right to education at issue in Rodriguez, is recognized in several
ways in the positive liberty welfare state mandate of the Basic Law.
To take the free press/literacy case, for example, a positive "value"
accompanies the negative "right." Thus, in the German schema:
A basic "right" is a negative right against the state, but this right
also represents a "value," and as a value it imposes an obligation
on the state to insure that it becomes an integral part of the
general legal order. [For example,] the right to freedom of the
press protects a newspaper against any [encroachment] of the
state... but as an objective value applicable to the society as a
whole, the state is duty-bound to create the conditions that
make freedom of the press both possible and effective.8
Among the arguments Germans use in favor of state obliga-
tions are exactly those that the majority in the United States
Supreme Court repeatedly rejected in cases like Rodriguez. First,
contra the majority view of Justice Powell, German jurists fre-
quently argue that effectuation-like values are required precisely
"to facilitate political participation and representative govern-
ment." 9 Second, contra Justice Stewart in his concurrence with the
majority, they argue that the Basic Law's welfare-state perspective
"requires the state[,] inter alia [,] to provide subsidies to persons
and groups who would not otherwise be able to exercise their
rights effectively."'10
7 See, e.g., id. at 68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8 Kommers, supra note 4, at 859. To be sure, within this example, it is not entirely
certain that free-speech and free-press rights through their corresponding values mandate
the provision or guarantee of some measure of literacy. See E.W. BocGENFORDE, STATE,
Socm'rY AND LiBmRTY 175-98 (1991).
9 Kommers, supra note 4. In Rodriguez, Justice Powell wrote:
[W]e have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to
guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed elec-
toral choice.
[T]he logical limitations on... [the] nexus theory are difficult to perceive.
How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from.., the basics of decent
food and shelter? Empirical examination might well [confirm] that the ill-fed,
ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the
political process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from the benefits of
the First Amendment.
411 U.S. at 36-37.
10 Kommers, supra note 4, at 873. In Rodriguez, Justice Stewart wrote that "the Equal
Protection Clause confers no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties. [Its]
function.. .rather, is simply to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws."
411 U.S. at 59.
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Thus, German legal ideology, like that of other welfare states
less committed to public/private and state/society distinctions than
the United States, contains a strain that tends to direct govern-
ments "to compensate for inequalities of wealth for which it was
not responsible."" In the overlapping area of campaign financing
and free speech, for example, the leading American cases are
mired in the free speech/marketplace of ideas discourse: in the
marketplace, money, however much one has of it, talks. In con-
trast, the West German constitutional court has invalidated the tax
deductibility of campaign contributions on the grounds that they,
benefitted wealthy taxpayers more than others, and, hence, worked
to the advantage of the more conservative parties.' 2
As another German constitutional scholar and Justice of the
German Federal Constitutional Court has put it, "[t]he particular,
liberty enshrined in the basic right is qualified in a special way by
relating all basic rights to values. As a result of this value dimen-
sion it is aimed at realizing and fulfilling the value expressed in and
through such rights.' 1 3 Crowning this hierarchy of values is some-
thing German jurists regularly call "the principle of human dig-
nity." This principle requires rejection of both legal positivism and
moral relativism, the very hallmarks of the American system of
negative rights. One former President of the German Court (the
equivalent of a U.S. Chief Justice) has gone so far as to say that the
guiding values of the German Basic Law are "equality, social jus-
11 David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 864,
883 (1986).-See also David P. Currie, Lochner Abroad: Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany, Sup. Or. REv. 333 (1989).
12 The two leading German cases are, Party Tax Deduction Cases, 8 BVerGE (1958)
and Party Finance Case, 20 BVerGE 56 (1966). In the not-unrelated area of television
broadcasting, the German high court has held that the state must "ensure" that the diver-
sity of existing opinions finds its greatest possible breadth and completeness through
broadcasting. The Third Television [Network], 57 BVerGE 295 (1989). Cf. Stephen A.
Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. W. 373 (1993) (the Ameri-
can situation). The leading American cases are Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (limita-
tions on independent political expenditures struck down as limiting free speech); First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (same, in the context of public referendum);
Cent. Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 537 (1980) (regulated public utility may
advertise to promote usage even as state encourages conservation). See also Miami Herald
Publishing v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (states may not compel newspapers to offer a
right of reply); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(anti-war campaign advertising need not be accepted for airing); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972) (as private entities, shopping centers may exclude leafletters and
speakers).
13 BOCHENFORDE, supra note 8, at 190-191.
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tice, the welfare state, the rule of law, and militant democracy. '14
It is difficult to imagine such testimony at an American Supreme
Court nomination hearing.
Because the German constitutional system explicitly recog-
nizes positive as well as negative rights, it can commit the state to
the effectuation or realization of guaranteed liberties. Hence, in ad-
dition to negative liberties, similar to the American's, that are in-
tended to protect individual freedom and autonomy (vis-a-vis the
state or other individuals), through its welfare-state Sozialstaat
("social state") commitment, the German constitution is commit-
ted programmatically to positive rights. A positive right, as Isaiah
Berlin also understood it,'5 represents a claim that the individual
may make on the state. As Kommers puts it, "[i]n the German
understanding[,] positive rights embrace not only a right to certain
social needs[,] but also a right to the effective realization of per-
sonal freedoms and autonomy. "16
Limited by the overarching, if somewhat abstract, requirement
of deference to human dignity and the common good, positive
rights constitute and generate entitlements that individual citizens
may claim from the state. Kommers sums it up (rather too
innocently):
[A]n individual... may need that state's help to enjoy a basic
right effectively such as, for example, equality. In this respect,
the notion of a right under the Basic Law is broader than the
concept of a right under the United States Constitution. A right
in the German constitutionalist view is not only the right to be
left alone, free of state interference, but the right to some form
of state assistance in the enjoyment of the right. 7
14 WOLFGANG ZEIDLER, GRUNDRECHTE UND GRUNDENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER VERFAS-
SUNG im WIDERsTREIT 4 (53 Deutschen Juristentages 1980), cited in Kommers, supra note
4, at 861, n.69. Even German law is double-edged, of course, and so it should be noted that
this paramount "principle of human dignity," particularly in the aftermath of Nazi eugen-
ics, was cited in 1975 to strike down a liberalized abortion statute 39BVerGE 1 (1975). See
JOACHIM PERELS, GRUNDRECHTE ALS FUNDAMNET DER DEMOKRATIE 11, 40 (1979).
15 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121-31
(1979) ("negative freedom" and "positive freedom"). The standard criticism of this dichot-
omy is that a person must be free from constraints in order to do an action. See Gerald C.
MaeCallum, Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REv. 312 (1967); ALAN RYAN,
PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1984); ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY (1987); Charles Tay-
lor, What's Wrong With Negative Liberty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF ISAIAH BER.IN 175 (Alan Ryan ed. 1979). America has simply not scaled the Isaiah
Berlin Wall.
16 Kommers, supra note 4, at 861.
17 Id. at 862.
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Needless to say, even under this sort of mixed capitalist-democracy
regime, the degree of assistance people receive from the state to
effectuate their rights is a matter of legislative, programmatic dis-
cretion. It is not set constitutionally, as it occasionally was in the
former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. 8 Even so, for those
who care about democracy and the welfare state, it is worth seeing
and imagining a "discursive terrain" or "field of struggle" broadly
different from America's.
Article 20(1) of the 1949 Basic Law describes the Federal Re-
public as a federal, democratic, and social state. This social com-
mitment or Sozialstaatlichkeit adds to the formal, procedural
equality of Rechtstaatlichkeit shared with the American constitu-
tional conception. In other words, justice is commanded along
with fairness.19 Equality transcends its purely formal meaning be-
cause, unlike in the United States, it is linked to the dual principles
of human dignity and the social welfare state. In addition, the
privileging of political parties affords individuals, as well as interest
groups, the opportunity to aggregate their interests along shared
ideological and organizational lines, thereby mitigating disparities
of income and wealth.2°
18 See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI.
L. REv. 519 (1992). Besides the vague German "social state" commitment, one finds in the
welfare capitalist democracies of western Europe, "programmatic" (not individually en-
forceable) constitutional statements like the Swedish:
The personal, economic and cultural welfare of the individual shall be funda-
mental aims of the activities of the community. In particular, it shall be incum-
bent on the community to secure the right to work, to housing and to education
and to promote social care and security as well as a favorable living
environment.
THE SWEDISH INSTRUMENT OF GovERNmENT art. 2 (entitled The Basic Principles of the
Constitution), quoted in Mary Ann Glendon, Rights and Responsibilities Viewed from Afar:
The Case of Welfare Rights, 4 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 33, 37 (1994).
19 Of course, American and German legal systems do belong to the same larger "Euro-
pean" legal culture. As Franz Wieacker has put it:
The same tension between property rights and contractual autonomy on the
one hand, and the social restrictions on private rights and their exercise on the
other is apparent in the private law of modern economic societies. Today, the
resulting autonomy between liberal and social Rechtsstaat poses one of the fun-
damental constitutional problems .... But this tension only confirms the extent
to which individual freedom and social duty (to use catchwords: individualism
and socialism) are two sides of the same coin: a specifically Western
personalism.
Franz Wieacker, Foundations of European Legal Culture, 38 AM. J. Comp. L., 22-23 (1990).
20 The virtues and vices of the so-called Parteinstaat have been much debated. For
introductions and summaries, see Michaela Richter, The Basic Law and the Democratic
Party State: Constitutional Theory and Political Practice, in CORNERSTONE OF DEMOC.
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Inevitably, the language of duties, also underdeveloped in
American law,21 joins the language of negative and positive rights.
With that joinder, communitarian relations and pressures join the
property based contractarianism that prevails in the American sys-
tem. A number of West European countries have constitutional-
ized an individual's duties to others. The 1947 Italian Constitution,
for example, imposes on citizens "the performance of unalterable
duties of a political, economic, and social nature, 22 directs that cit-
izens undertake "an activity or a function contributing to the mate-
rial and moral progress of society," 23 and enumerates specific
duties, including the support and education of one's children2 4 and
the duty to vote.25 The post-Franco Spanish Constitution of 1978
speaks of "[t]he Rights and Duties of Citizens" and specifies, inter
alia, the duty to work,26 the duty to support one's children,2 7 the
duty to defend the country,2 and a duty to create "an environment
suitable to the development of the person. '2 9
Real autonomy, real individual freedom, is seen as requiring
much more than the ultimate, market based American virtue:
choice.31 Our own emphasis on individual autonomy - choice -
RAcy: THE WEST GERMAN GRUNDGESETZ, 1949-89, at 37 (Detlef Junker et al. eds., 1995).
But see Claus Offe & Helmut Wiesenthal, Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical
Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form, 1 POL. POWER & Soc. THEORY 67 (1980)
(asymmetry of politics and markets as respective arenas in which citizens and big business
interests organize to achieve core demands).
21 See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV.
673 (1994) (seeking to establish bases for rescue and other duties).
22 ITALY CONST. art 2, translated in 9 CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 47 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds., 1987).
23 Id. art.4, translated in 9 CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THM WORLD 47 (A.
Blaustein & G. Flanz eds., 1987).
24 Id. pt. I, tit. IV, art. 48, translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 53 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds., 1987).
25 Id. pt. I, tit. IV, art. 48, translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 58 ( A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds., 1987).
26 SPAIN CONST. tit. I, ch. II, Section 2, art. 35, translated in 18 CONsTrmUTONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 50 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds., 1991).
27 Id. tit.I ch. III, art. 39, translated in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 51 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds., 1991).
28 Id. tit.I, ch. I1, Section 2, art.30, translated in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 49 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds., 1991).
29 Id. tit. I, ch. III, art.45, translated in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF TH
WORLD 52 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds., 1991).
30 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); probablyfaute de mieux, represents the apotheosis
of "choice." Indeed, defense of the principle enunciated there has become the "pro-
choice" movement. Of course, in real material terms there is generally little "free" about
the abortion choice. And Roe itself posits autonomous, isolated women, alone and unat-
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makes collective action, whether as a family, a neighborhood, or a
trade union, much more difficult than in Europe. We fear, disdain
and avoid the dependency (and not just interdependency) that is
necessarily intertwined with collective action. To stop with nega-
tive liberty and to rest content with resource-based choice by atom-
istic individuals is, in the German and other social-democratic
regimes, to misunderstand and underestimate personhood.3' The
German Supreme Court has explicitly held that:
The concept of man in the Basic Law [(German Constitution)] is
not that of an isolated, sovereign individual; rather, the Basic
Law has decided in favor of a relationship between individual
and community in the sense of a person's dependence on the
commitment to the community, without infringement upon a
person's individual value.32
Thus, in some respects, society takes precedence to the indi-
vidual and has legitimate claims over him. The relationship be-
tween self and society is constitutive, not merely instrumental.
Public and private, state and society are (for better or worse) far
less bifurcated than in the American system. Such a view necessar-
ily rejects radical individualism, with its own attendant rejection of
duties. That individualism characterizes not only ACLU-style lib-
erals, but also liberal free marketers and post-modem radicalism,
whose non-Heideggerian forms are themselves, in fact, forms of
hyper-liberalism.
tached to family or community (except insofar as family and community might impinge on
the autonomy and free choice of the woman involved). There are no values that might
transcend the woman's present interests because her interest is presumed to be private,
self-realization.
On the (mis)uses of "choice" to undervalue constraint in several areas of American
law and policy, see Martha Minow, Choice and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall,
80 GEo. L.. 2093 (1992).
31 This social-democratic communitarian position goes at least as far back as Marx:
[T]he so-called rights of man ... are simply the rights ... of egoistic man, of
man separated from other men and from the community... None of the sup-
posed rights of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, man as he is as a mem-
ber of civil society; that is an individual separated from the community,
withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting
in accordance with his private caprice... [S]pecies-life itself -society- appears
as a system which is external to the individual and as a limitation of his original
independence. The only bond between men is natural necessity, need and pri-
vate interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic persons.
KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question, in EARLY WRrrrNGs 24-26 (T. Bottomore & Maxi-
milien Rubel eds., 1964).
32 4 BVerfGE 7, 15-16 (1954), cited in Kommers, supra note 4, at 873, n. 96.
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As might be imagined, a system like Germany's can have diffi-
culties with sub-communities or even multiculturalism. More gen-
erally, it is no accident that the most successful welfare states have
been established in countries with substantial ethnic homogeneity:
if I am to be my "brother's keeper," I might well prefer that my
brother resemble me closely. Finally, it cannot be gainsaid that the
constitutionalization of values and duties can put undesirable mi-
norities at risk and that social solidarity can induce a conformity
offensive to the libertarian impulse.
